

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-M-237

11 September 1980

Minutes
Two Hundred and Thirty-third Meeting
Wednesday, 10 September 1980, 1000-1200 Hours
Room 1A07, Langley Headquarters Building

[REDACTED]
Chairman
Presiding

STATINTL

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Maynard Anderson, Office of Secretary of Defense
[REDACTED], USA, Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Department of the Army
[REDACTED], National Security Agency
[REDACTED], Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice
Col. Robert A. Shiver, Department of the Air Force
Mr. Dennis Southern, Department of Treasury
Mr. Richard Welch, Department of the Navy

ALTERNATES PRESENT

Mr. Frank Dill, Department of the Army
Mr. James W. Gerblich, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Louis C. Kachulis, Department of State
Mr. Edward P. Walsh, Department of Treasury
[REDACTED], Defense Intelligence Agency

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. John Crandall, Office of Personnel Management
Mr. A. Barry Dalinski, Department of Energy

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STATINTL [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. George Henricksen, Department of the Navy
Mr. Vaughn V. Holcombe, Department of Treasury
Mr. Jerry James, Federal Bureau of Investigation
STATINTL [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. David McCabe, Department of State (Retired)
Mr. Peter Nelson, Department of Defense
Mr. Kenneth Orzell, Department of State
Mr. William H. Randolph, Department of Commerce
STATINTL [redacted] National Security Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Michael Smelser, Department of Treasury
Mr. Donald Stigers, Department of State
STATINTL [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Executive Secretary, Security Committee
STAT [redacted] Messrs [redacted] STATINTL
and [redacted] Community Security Group

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PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

1. The Chairman opened the meeting by welcoming persons newly associated with the Committee:

a. [] as the new DIA member; STATINTL

b. Mr. Dennis (Denny) Raugh as the new DEA observer, replacing Bud Frank who just retired; and

c. [] a new member of the Committee staff assigned to the personnel security branch. The Chairman noted that [] had extensive CIA field experience in personnel security. STATINTL

2. The Chairman noted that [] has retired after nearly 40 years' Government service, but will remain as the NSA member and that agency's director of security until a successor is designated. [] expressed his and the Committee's appreciation to [] for his outstanding services to our overall security effort. STATINTL
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ITEM 1

1. This meeting was scheduled as a single item session to address the Survey of the Investigative Standards Working Group on Personnel Security. The Chairman suggested that the Committee approach the issue of personnel security standards by first addressing the report itself and then the recommendations made by the Working Group based on the Report. The Chairman then spoke to what he said was a crucial point. He noted that some written comments on the report and recommendations reflected apparent beliefs that the Security Committee's jurisdiction in personnel security was limited to matters pertaining to SCI access. [] said we were a DCI Committee, and noted that his reading of the National Security Act and Executive Order 12036 was that the DCI and this Committee were not limited in the security area to SCI. The Chairman referred to section 403(d)(3) of the National Security Act, paragraph 3.f of NSCID No. 1, and sections 1-601(i), 1-604(b) and 1-710 of E.O. 12036 as establishing the DCI's responsibility for protection of intelligence generally. [] stated that the Committee's charter, DCID 1/11, reflects the full range of these DCI authorities. He noted that ongoing Committee actions in such matters as technical surveillance counter-measures, computer security, DCID 1/7 markings, leak investigation coordination, and security R&D, show that this Committee has a wide role and that, with full Community participation, it has been responsive to the DCI's responsibilities and has been involved in all matters of intelligence security.

2. Mr. Kelly, Army, then observed that poor terminology may have been used in some comments. He acknowledged that the DCI's and the SECOM's jurisdiction extended to all U.S. foreign intelligence information and sources and methods. He said the distinction that needed to be kept in mind was that the security of nonintelligence classified information was the province of others. Mr. Anderson, Defense, said in this regard that their comments were meant to address what they thought were the intended limits of the survey and recommendations, and were not meant to be taken as a challenge to the DCI's and Committee's jurisdiction.

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3. Questions on whether the survey was meant to be limited to SCI matters were answered as follows. Survey objectives, stated on page 1 of the report, show that a range of personnel security cases were meant to be covered. Figure II-1, on page 10 of the report, shows that only about half of the 5,204 investigations which served as the data base of the survey were for SCI access. [] said STATINTL that since those assembled were the Community's experts on security, he believed we should address the issues in terms of what is best for security and should be willing to share our conclusions and findings with those outside the Community who had nonintelligence security investigative responsibilities.

4. At the Chairman's request, Mr. McCabe, former chairman of the Investigative Standards Working Group, spoke to the Group's objectives. He noted that while the 1977 pilot study focused on SCI cases, the Working Group had addressed a variety of cases in the SECOM-endorsed continuation of the effort in order to gain a basis for comparisons. He said their discussion of the polygraph in the report and recommendations was reflective of the survey's demonstration of the polygraph's effectiveness in developing pertinent security data and of the conclusion that such effectiveness merited serious consideration. [] STAT noted that members had over the years frequently voiced concerns about the adequacy of background investigations for Top Secret clearances. He acknowledged that this was a factor in setting the Working Group's scope of inquiry.

STATINTL 5. [] then called on members to comment in turn on the survey.

6. Mr. Kachulis, State, said they thought the report was good. He then summarized State's previously provided memorandum addressing survey recommendations.

STATINTL 7. [] NSA, said they supported the study and recommendations. He spoke in favor of using the polygraph, and noted that it was an excellent means of avoiding problems under the "Jane Doe" decision. He suggested the desirability of SECOM supporting efforts to gain adequate resources for the Defense Investigative Service.

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8. Col. Shiver, Air Force, said there was a great deal of emotional resistance to use of the polygraph. He noted Air Force opposition to it at this point.

9. Mr. Southern and Mr. Holcombe spoke for Treasury. They noted that the survey had not received study at higher levels in their department. They said that use of the polygraph was a significant problem area for them.

10. Mr. Anderson, Defense, said the survey report was very good. He noted that Defense has some 2.2 million employees and contractors who require security clearances, and said that resource considerations must be acknowledged concomitantly with any proposal or discussion of broadening investigative coverage. He advised that Defense was seeking more adequate resources for DIS. He noted that DIS was conducting a study of 1000 Investigative cases and that this study would contribute to the data base on the value of personal interviews in connection with DCID 1/14 type investigations.

11. Mr. Dalinski, DOE, said they found the survey report very useful in supporting their efforts to upgrade Energy's Personnel Security Program. He said they were interested in examining use of the polygraph, and that they supported continued use of the 15-year scope for investigations. He noted that they are pursuing a study of what additional screening techniques may be incorporated in their present program to improve effectiveness in making determinations. One area they are addressing is the possible use of psychological testing.

12. Mr. Gerblich, FBI, said they agreed with almost all recommendations except for those on the polygraph. He noted that FBI Director Webster had had a 2-year study done on the polygraph. It resulted in a policy position in the Bureau which delineated conditions for limited use of the polygraph. This did not include use of the polygraph as a screening device.

13. Mr. Rubino, Justice, said their only measurable problems with the recommendations centered on the polygraph. He noted that Justice was now studying possible use of the

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STATINTL polygraph for specific issues at the close of investigations. He said he could not see approval forthcoming for polygraph use as a screening mechanism. He agreed with a suggestion by [] that the concept of a standard statement of personal history should be explored. Mr. Rubino noted the distinct contrast between widely varying investigative practices shown by the survey report and broad Community access to information of the same levels of sensitivity.

14. Mr. Welch, Navy, said they thought the survey was a good effort. He suggested that the contentious issues of polygraph and Top Secret clearance standards not be pursued further. He proposed that the Committee address DCID 1/14 in the light of survey results.

STATINTL 15. [] DIA, said they concur basically with the study. He read a statement summarizing their views on the recommendations.

16. Mr. Kelly, Army, said the working group had done a very useful piece of work. Mr. Kelly introduced as a new item the possibility of dispensing with fingerprint cards in cases of update investigations if study showed that they served no useful purposes.

STATINTL 17. [] CIA, said the survey satisfied the tasking. He commended those who did the work on it. He expressed his disappointment that there were so many negative reactions to the polygraph. He suggested that the Committee approach possible use of the polygraph on an incremental basis, and not drop it from consideration because there was opposition. He strongly supported the concept of an adjudicators' seminar. Mr. Anderson said Defense was not closing the door on any investigative technique, but he noted that there were serious political considerations which required that the prospective use of polygraph be dealt with on a careful basis.

18. Without objection, [] stated that the STATINTL Committee's consensus favored steps toward uniformity and standardization in personnel security investigations

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and related matters. [redacted] suggested that SECOM could be helpful in developing information supporting efforts to obtain adequate investigative resources.

ITEM 2 - Next Meeting

In subsequent discussion, the Chairman proposed and members agreed to another special meeting to continue the discussion of the Report and to address recommendations arising from it. Members agreed to dedicate the previously scheduled September 24th meeting to discussion of survey recommendations, and to schedule a regular meeting for October 1. Both meetings will begin at 10:00 a.m. Room 4E64 CIA Headquarters.

[redacted]

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Executive Secretary